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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\"ILLIA"l L. POLLEI andESTHID 
L. POLLE!, his wife, ! 
Plaintiffs a11d Rcspo11dc11ts, 
vs. ·. Case No. 
I 11775 
.J and LEXOHE \ 
)l. Bl IH_Tl' .. R, his wife, 
Defendants ruul Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
FCllTI-IEH STATE)IENT OF FACTS 
The facts surrounding the acknowledgment of 
Exhibit P-1 are not recited in appellants' statement of 
t'aets but at pages 7 and 8 of appellants' brief. 
Exhibit P-2, the warranty deed, was acknowledged 
Huth I. Smith on .May 28, HW2, and the mortgage 
tr1 Zions Savings Bank (Exhibit P-3) was acknowl-
l'Uged the same date by the same person. The Uniform 
1 
Real Etate Contract date<l :\lay 26, 196:2 was acknowJ. 
edged January 7, 1964 before Helen R. Fife. 
Mr. Pollei testified that he was in Elko when tbt 
contract was signed as it was just a formality with hin; 
and he <loesn't know Helen Fife ( R-50). He furthtr 
testified that it was he who had the Uniform Reai 
Estate Contract recorde<l in January 1964 and that he 
was present when the notary signed it ( R-51). He ahl, 
testified that the property prior to sale was in the narnt 
of his wife (R-50). 
l\Irs. Pollei testifie<l at first that Helen Fife wa1 
at the bank (R-47), that the contract was signed at 
the bank with the Polleis and 'Vursts all present (R 
48). Upon further questioning she testified that Helen 
Fife is secretary to Peter Lowe and that she and her 
husband went there to have the contract acknowledged 
(R-48) and that Des Townsend and Verda Lynn sent 
them there ( R-50) . 
ARG Ul\IENT 
Point 1. Are the respondents precluded under 
Utah law from asserting a vendor's lien? 
Point 2. 'Y as there a defective acknowledgment 
of the contract? 
Point 3. Are plaintiffs estopped to assert or han 
they waived a vendor's lien? 
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Pui11t 1. Arc tlic precluded under ['tali 
'<l'i. from as.iertinq a vendor's lien? 
The contract (Exhibit P-1) provides: 
"The shall ulitain a $25,000 loan from 
Zion's First X ational llank and apply the net 
proceeds therefrom to the purchase ot this prop-
erty. The Buyers shall assign a $10,000 contract 
knmvn as the Lawrence R. Grover contract to 
the Sellers. The balance of $5,000 shall be paid 
at the rate of $56.15 per month beginning on 
July 1, 1962, and on the first day of every month 
thereafter until fully paid." 
This plainly provides that a first mortgage must 
he given to Zion's First N atoinal llank and that the 
balance is to be paid in two ditf erent ways, by assign-
ment of a contract which is the equivalent of a payment 
, 1f with a final balance of $5,000 to be paid 
monthly. 
To carry out this contract a warranty deed was 
1'(i\·m immediatley (Exhibit P-2) and simultaneously 
with the mortgage to Zion's First National Bank (Ex-
hibit P-3), both dated .May 28, 1962. and recorded 
29, 1962. Then the vendees made the payments 
of $56.15 per month until in 1964 there was some 
difficulty about collection (R-40, 41). The real estate 
contract was then recorded upon the advice of an attor-
ney and a real estate broker (R-42, 50), and then pay-
mc11ts continued until 1966 (R-40), appellants ha,·ing 
purchased the property in April 1966 (Exhibit P-8) . 
Th( District Court held that the plaintiffs had a ,·e11-
3 
dor's lien of which the defeudauts had constructi\t 
notice through recordation and that plaintiffs wert 
entitled to foreclosure of their lien ( R-:20, 21). 
Existence of a vendor's lien is recognized in 
CJS, Vendor and Purchaser, §396 and §401, the latter 
citation in paragraph ( b) ( :2) says in part: 
"\V?erc a or purchase-money note 
reservmg a vendors lien is recorded, a subse-
quent purchaser takes with notice of the 
lien. \Vhere an instrument executed by the pur-
chaser showing that he withholds a portion of 
the purchase price, is recorded, a subsequent 
purchaser takes with notice of the lien." 
45 Arn. Jur., Records, §87, p. 469 is similar. 
Vendor's lien is recognized in Bell v. Jones, 104 
Utah 306, 139 P2d 884, and in M cM urdie v. Chug,<1, 
99 Utah 403, 107 P2d 163, 132 ALR 440; and in Peter-
son v. Carter, 11 Utah 2d 381, 359 P2d 1055, cited by 
appellants. 
In M cMurdie (supra) vendors made an agreement 
to sell property to Chugg and thereafter executed a 
warranty deed conveying the property, leaving part 
of the purchase price unpaid and evidenced by promis· 
sory notes for the balance due under the contract. 
Vendor's administrator brought the action to foreclose 
the vendor's lien as having priority over claim of home-
stead by the Chuggs and the court held the vendor's 
lien to be valid. 
Petersou v. Carter (supra) does not deny the exist-
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cnce of a vendor's lien, but holds that the vendor 
\la!'\ precluded from asserting liens of the vendor where 
tht yendor and vendee had gone into a joint undertak-
ing with the land, the vendor controlling the funds 
which were due him and he disbursed them to others 
and then sought to hold the vendee. 
In Larson v. 1lletcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N.\\'. 
:38:2, 45 ALR 344, the court recognized the vendor's 
lien against a subsequent purchaser, holding that the 
lien "follows the property sold into the hands of the 
heirs, and even future vendees with notice," which notice 
can be either actual or constructive. 
The recording of the C niform Real Estate Con-
tract was more than two years before purchase of the 
property by the defendants-appellants. Such recorda-
tion, under Section 57-3-2 U.C.A. 1953 
'· * * * shall, from the time of filing the same 
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all 
persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be 
deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
Point 2. Was there a defective ackrwwledgment 
of the contract? 
The plaintiffs, who gave the acknowledgment on 
the uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit P-1), were 
the vendors and were the claimants of the lien, or in 
the position of equitable mortgagors. Section 57-1-6 
e.C.A. l!J53 provides in part: 
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"E f ,·ery conn::yaIH.'e u real estate, and e'·er 
instrume11t of" riti11g setti11g forth an 
to com·ey any real estate or whereby any rea' 
may be affected. to operate as notice tl: 
third shall be proYed or acknow !edged 
and certified 111 the manner prescribed by th11 
title and recorded in the office of the 
of the county in which such real estate is 
td ***" a e , 
The form of acknowledgment is established by 
Section 57-2-7, which was used by the notary on E;. 
hibit P-1. 
It is true that an alternate form is established by 
Section 51-2-8 where the grantor is unknown to the 
officer, but appellants adduced no facts to establish 
those facts. l\Ir. Pollei said he didn't know Helen Fife 
( R-50) ; but l\Irs. Pollei knew her ( R-48, 50) and there 
was no testimony that Helen Fife did not know both 
of the Polle is. It is the notary's lack of acquaintarm 
with the signers and not the lack of acquaintance r);' 
the signers with the notary \vhich permits the use 01 
the alternate form. 
There are no facts in this case which bring it within 
the authority cited by appellants in their brief on page 8 
Poiut 3. A re plaintiffs estoµpcd to assert or hat't' 
they ·waived a vendors lien? 
In JJJ c)}l urdic v. Clwyr; (supra) this court stated: 
"It is a well-established rule of law that a 
yendor docs uut wai,·e his \Tndor's lien for the 
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purchase pril'l' simply hy laki11g thl' n·ndce·s 
own personal note for the amount due. If the 
ycn_dor aecepts tht' of a third party 
or 1f he expressly wa1,·es his lien it ma\· be ex-
tinguished hut the taking of the un-
secured promissory note of the huver cannot be 
held to bl' a waiYer of the lien." · 
.).} A.111 . .fur .• Yl'ndor a11<l Purchaser, p. 
itii. it is stated: 
"Contractual prodsions as to the consideralio11 
to he paid by the purchaser are ordinarih- not 
merged in the dee<l, and accordingly, e\·idencc 
of such contractual provisions is admissible to 
show what consideration is to be paid bv the 
purchaser although a deed has been accepted. 
In case of deeds, the recital of the consideration 
is not conclusive as regards the actual considera-
tion, and it mav be shown bv oral eYidence that 
a different or greater consideration was agreed 
to be paid." 
It is also stated in 55 Am . .I u r., Y endor and Pur-
drn:'ier, §4u:l, that existence of an action at law to re-
cm·er the purchase price does not preclude an equitable 
adion to establish a Yendor's lien. In their action against 
the original yendees the plaintiffs in no way released 
the ,·ernlor's lien, which had been recorded two years 
after the giYing of the original warranty deed. It ap-
pears that in this case the appellants' title examiner 
failed to pick up the recordation of the real 
eontract (see testimony of Larsen of 
Land Title Company, R-5!l, 60, Exhibit D-10 as of 
3 1 tifi). Plaintiffs acted promptly by notifying the 
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appellants promptly of the existence of the lieu whu1 
the appellants moYed into the property ( U-45-46, 
an<l Exhibit P-5). 
The authorities cited by appellants at pages 8 and 
n are not applicable where the contract, as it due:i 11 : 
Exhibit P-1, recites that following the raising u! 
$25,000 on a first mortgage and acceptance of $10,0011 
as a payment in the form of assignment of other 
with a balance of $5,000 to be paid monthly, 
the limited purpose of the deed and that there is unpaid 
money due the vendor over a period of three years. 
No facts suggest any waiver or relinquishment ot 
the vendor's lien. Without releasing the property tht 
plaintiffs tried in vain to collect the money from the 
original ven<lees. There is no evidence that this preju-
diced defendants in any way. 
Plaintiff-respondents pray for affirmance of the 
Judgment and Decree of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS & "r ATKINS 
By Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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